As of the 3rd of November, the time of writing this article, mass protests have been shaking Serbia’s political establishment. Serbia, a country striving to make progress on its path toward EU membership while maintaining friendly ties with Russia and China, has sparked speculation about a potential colour revolution as an interpretation of the current situation. We will sift through the facts to determine whether this is the case.
Let us first take a moment to consider the narrative of colour revolutions. Typically, this term refers to an attempt by a foreign power—such as the United States—to instigate a mass revolt aimed at overthrowing an existing government and replacing it with one that better serves the geopolitical and economic objectives of that power. This idea is misleading to the extent that it places the blame entirely on foreign influence, ignoring local conditions and problems while absolving the existing government of responsibility. It is difficult to believe that even the United States could mobilize thousands of people in a country that is entirely free of problems and concerns. Therefore, one of the prerequisites for such a movement is the existence of real and legitimate grievances; otherwise, mass mobilization would not be possible.
The real risk of a colour revolution arises when there is an opportunity for external forces to hijack a movement. This risk emerges in situations where there is either no clear structure to the movement, the demands are vague or fail to address deep-rooted social issues, there is no leverage to enforce the implementation of demands, or the movement is a loose coalition that disintegrates after achieving its initial objective (e.g., the removal of the government) without any remaining forces to follow through on its demands. This list is by no means exhaustive.
Returning to the political situation in Serbia, it is important to note a few key facts. First, these protests are part of a series that has occurred over the past several years. What they all have in common is the liberal opposition’s attempt to exploit popular discontent over significant societal issues, transforming it into political capital to win elections. They have tried this strategy before, such as in the aftermath of the tragic school shooting. Whenever the opposition succeeds in pressuring the government, President Vučić calls for early elections and emerges victorious. This has been his modus operandi. The most recent extraordinary elections took place in 2023, with his party winning and leaving the liberal opposition in a state of political bankruptcy.
What sets the current protests apart, however, is that they are not led by political parties but by students. Historically, students have proven to be an effective tool for mass mobilization, especially when opposition parties fail to garner significant public support, as is the case now.
The protests were triggered by the collapse of a canopy at Novi Sad’s main railway station, which tragically killed 15 people. The students’ main demands revolve around this incident: they are calling for the release of all documentation related to the construction, the punishment of those responsible, legal action against anyone who compromised student safety, and a 20% increase in budgeted spots for students.
The majority of the students come from middle-class backgrounds, and the protests are largely dominated by liberals. Both the opposition and NGOs are persistently trying to co-opt the movement, something the “apolitical” students are struggling to avoid. This failure is largely because their demands are not anti-imperialist but instead align with the opposition’s goals. While there is an idealistic fascination with general strikes and revolution among some participants, the situation does not appear promising for them to achieve their demands.
Meanwhile, the West is using this as an opportunity to pressure Vučić on the “Kosovo” issue and sanctions against Russia. Just a few days ago, Serbs were expelled from all Serbian institutions south of the Ibar River in “Kosovo,” and efforts are underway to push out Russian capital from the country, with the majority Russian ownership of NIS being a primary target.
The student body is not monolithic. While there are communists involved, including members of communist parties, their numbers are small, and their influence is limited. However, it is worth noting that the students organize themselves around the concept of Councils, which serve as a platform for the communist minority to expand their influence.
Another aspect often ignored or oversimplified in discussions of protests and potential colour revolutions is the role of the government. The possibility of a colour revolution is sometimes used to absolve the government of its anti-popular policies and responsibility for social issues. There is a tendency to portray the government as progressive simply because it is on the receiving end of imperialist geopolitical maneuvering. In particular, the policies of the Vučić government are often depicted as pro-Russian and, at times, even anti-Western. If one listens to his speeches, it might indeed seem that way. In practice, however, his government is largely aligned with the policies of the collective West. In cases where it is not—such as on the question of “Kosovo” and the issue of Russia—it is too risky for him to go against the will of the majority of his supporters. In other words, the majority of Serbians harbor deep resentment toward the EU and NATO and would not tolerate policies that would lead to the abandonment of the struggle for their southern province, which is occupied by imperialist forces.
To this we can add a note around the latest development: that of resignation of the Prime Minister Miloš Vučević. His political role is minor in comparison to that of Vučić, and this move could be interpreted as either an attempt to do cosmetic changes to the government, or to provoke another round of elections that would lead to reinforcement of his position.
With this in mind, we do not believe there is direct Western involvement in the protests. However, we do fear that the risk of a takeover by external or opposition forces is real and present. The people of Serbia are in a very difficult position, where the government clings to power only because it is slow to surrender to imperialism, and the only alternative appears to be outright integration into imperialist structures and the abandonment of any viable path toward independence and sovereignty.
